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The evolution of semiconductor manufacturing was very much driven by precision 
control demands in the United States military but because of its complementary and 
enabler properties it is increasingly diffusing into the manufacture and use of many 
different products and processes. It is therefore very common to find semiconductor chips 
driving central panel control systems in the manufacture of steel and cement, cad-cam 
machines in garment making, monitoring of captive salmon, storing of graphic memory 
in digital cameras, powering computers and providing control to computer numeric 
control (CNCs) and electronic device machines (EDMs). Although the processes of 
manufacturing semiconductor chips varies in sophistication – from simple transistors that 
replaced cathode ray tubes (CRT) in the transfusion of picture in televisions to 
sophisticated microprocessors that power supercomputers – the design and fabrication of 
chips remains high technology. Hence, catch up attempts in the industry has required 
lumpy investments in large physical plants, machinery and equipment, human capital and 
its requisite matching demand. Scale economies have not fallen despite continued 
miniaturization and the decomposition of semiconductor manufacturing vertically into 
chip design, chip fabrication, assembly and test. Even in Taiwan Amsden and Chu (2003) 
and Rasiah and Lin (2006) have argued that scale requirements has driven up firm size. 
Despite similarities the sources of learning and innovation in the industry as articulated 
by Malerba and Nelson in this volume are expected to be different from the routes taken 
by firms in the other industries in the volume. 
 
Governments in the four countries, viz., China, Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan, have all 
taken serious steps to promote semiconductor manufacturing and therefore offer a unique 
set of experiences to examine variations in the catch up process. These countries also 
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provide enough diversity to examine variations. China with a population of 1.4 billion in 
2006 has a large domestic market and has since 1978 been integrating an essentially 
centrally planned economy into the capitalist world system. With a population of 47 
million in 2006 Korea is the next biggest and in Samsung the country has a shaper of the 
technology frontier in dynamic random access memory (DRAM) and Nand flash chips. 
Malaysia and Taiwan with populations of 25 and 19 millions respectively in 2006 are 
smaller economies where domestic demand never acted as the major stimulant of rapid 
manufacturing growth. Taiwan is the smallest of the four economies but Taiwan 
Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) is not only the first contract 
manufacturer of semiconductor chips that has separated chip design from chip fabrication 
but has caught up swiftly to join Samsung at the DRAM frontier. 
 
This chapter aims at explaining the key drivers among the four late-comers of China, 
Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan, in the origin of semiconductor manufacturing and in the 
pace of catch up achieved in the four economies using the framework of sectoral system 




2 Historical Backdrop 
 
 
Unlike in the pioneering economy of the United States where the government-led military 
and later the domestic market were critical in the origin and spread of semiconductors 
using silicon (the prime material used in semiconductor devices) and gallium arsenide 
(see Marsh, 1981),
5
 the main drivers of demand in China, Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan 
have largely been export markets. China is the only one among the four that had a 
military plan targeted at the computer and semiconductor industry during Chairman 
Mao’s administration. The government created the Ministry of Electronics Industry 
(MEI) but the subsequent growth in semiconductor production from the 1980s has had 
little link with both instruments. 
 
Large-scale foreign-driven semiconductor assembly emerged in Taiwan and Korea, 
Malaysia and China in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s respectively following the opening of 
export processing zones. Multinationals seeking low wage, literate and disciplined 
workers in locations with good basic infrastructure and security relocated assembly and 
later test operations in these countries. Special export processing zones were created and 
coordinated in these countries to attract semiconductor firms. Employment creation 
started as the prime policy aim of the host governments in the initial phase.  
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 Gallium arsenide technology is sometimes still preferred over silicon owing to the higher frequency and 
light emitting functions it allows government financed research in the military labs (e.g. Bell Laboratory), 
key universities such as MIT, University of Chicago and Purdue University were instrumental in the 
development of diodes and transistors in the United States. Fairchild was the first private semiconductor 
firm created to fabricate and manufacture transistor chips following the transfer of technology from the Bell 
laboratory in 1948 (see Marsh, 1981). 




Among the four countries Korea was the first to attempt integrated semiconductor 
production operations when Samsung acquired a local firm in 1975 to venture into chip 
manufacturing. Wafer fabrication subsequently began to mushroom outside the developed 
economies when leading semiconductor firms started to outsource  fabrication owing to  
rising production costs, quick technological obsolescence and falling profit margins from 
the 1980s (Rasiah, 1993; Zook, 1999). Apart from microprocessors where only Advanced 
Micro Devices (AMD) has fabrication facilities outside the United States in Leipzig since 
2003 the fabrication of most other integrated circuits, diodes and transistors are 
increasingly being outsourced. Intel has one memory wafer fab plant and announced 
plans in 2007 to build another in China. Taiwan’s United Micro Electronics (UMC) has 
contract fabrication operations in Singapore. Infineon started power chip fabrication in 
Kulim, Malaysia in 2006. Osram is the other foreign firm having fabrication operations in 
Malaysia. 
 
The historical evolution of the semiconductor industry in China, Korea, Malaysia and 
Taiwan can be summarized as follows: 
 
China Semiconductors got strategic status when computers and semiconductor devices 
were made a national industry for research during Mao Ze Dong’s leadership when the 
Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI) was also created. The initial stage development of 
IC industry in China could be traced from the middle of 1960s. The first semiconductor 
integrated circuit device called digital logic (DTL) circuit was developed successfully in 
1965, which led to the successful development of TTL, ECL, PMOS, n-type metal oxide 
semiconductor (NMOS) and complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) 
technologies. The basic R&D elements related to materials, equipment, manufacturing 
and techniques were largely developed before the 1980s and occurred in the MEI, 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Ministry of Spaceflights. Apart from 
microprocessors, it can be argued that prior to 1980 Chinese IC technology was close to 
that of the world. However, in the period 1980-95, IC industrial development began to 
fall behind that of the firms at the technology frontier. The domestic products were 
mainly middle or low level products above 0.8 micron. Most of the high technology 
products such as central processing unit (CPU) for civil usage and DSP for mobile 
telecommunication were imported from foreign countries.  
 
There are many explanations on the stagnant development in this period. One explanation 
is that government focus on semiconductor R&D declined as foreign semiconductor firm
s relocated assembly and test operations in China from the 1980s. China enjoyed its first 
large scale manufacturing of semiconductors following the relocation of American plants 
in export processing zones (EPZs).  Flagship firms such as Intel, National Semiconductor 
(Fairchild now), Motorola (Freescale now), Chippac relocated operations in China but 
regulations requiring that non-joint ventures must export all output meant that these firms 
had to target export markets rather than the domestic market. China’s share of global IC 
and electronic components exports rose from 1.7 percent in 2000 to 5.9 percent in 2005 
(computed from Table 1). 
 
While a strong FDI-led platform was evolving from the 1980s, the Chinese government 




also launched instruments to encourage R&D in semiconductors and to assist the opening 
of local firms in strategic industries that included semiconductors, computers and 
telecommunication equipments. The acquisition of the computer manufacturing division 
of IBM worldwide by Chinese firm Lenova, and the expansion of Taiwanese owned Acer, 
American owned Dell and HP into China heralded a major breakthrough for Chinese 
semiconductor firms, which now have the market potential to sell chips to major users. 
IBM was already manufacturing computers in China before the Lenova takeover. 
 
Korea The early EPZ-type assembly operations that began in the 1960s was superseded 
by the opening of the first local semiconductor firm in Korea in 1974. This firm was 
subsequently bought by Samsung in 1975 to start off the catch up process in the 
semiconductor industry. The launching of the Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCI) by 
the government in 1975 was pivotal in attracting Samsung’s entry into semiconductor 
chip manufacturing, though, the firm was also motivated by its own self-expansion plans 
to supply its consumer electronics subsidiaries (Kim, 1997: 88). 
 
Imports and adaptation of machinery and equipment and the absorption of process 
technologies, acquisition of ailing foreign firms, and gradually  in-house development 
through the hiring of Korean engineers and scientists carrying tacit and experiential 
knowledge from in foreign firms helped Samsung to reach the technology frontier in 
DRAM chips in1984 (see Edquist and Jacobssen, 1987; Kim, 1997). Samsung has since 
been shaping the technology frontier in DRAM and Nand flash chips. Samsung, Hyundai, 
and LG Electronics back-integrated from consumer and telecommunication products. 
 
Malaysia National Semiconductor relocated operations in Penang in 1971 to start the 
industry in Malaysia. This firm was followed by Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), 
Mostek (sold later to Thomson CSF in 1986 which later sold the plant to International 
Device Technology in 1989), Hewlett Packard, Monolithic Memories (acquired by AMD 
in 1989) and Intel by 1976. A parallel relocation of American semiconductor firms also 
occurred in Kuala Lumpur and Petaling Jaya: Texas Instruments, Motorola,
6
 Western 
Digital, MEMC and Harris Semiconductor relocated operations in Kuala Lumpur and 
Petaling Jaya in the 1970s. Hitachi and Siemens were the first Japanese and European 
semiconductor firms respectively to relocate operation in Malaysia in 1973. All the firms 
began with front-end assembly operations using labour-intensive technology. NEC, 
Motorola, Fujitsu (Senawang and Seremban) and ST Microelectronics (formerly known 
as SGS-Thomson) (Muar) subsequently started operations in Malaysia from the 1980s. 
Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor firms such as Samsung and ASE began assembly 
and test operations from the 1990s in Senawang and Johor respectively. Whereas test 
activities were incorporated by the early semiconductor firms in the Malaysian operations 
by the MNCs from 1976 firms that relocated after 1976 were integrated assembly and test 
operations. The subcontract firm of Carter Semiconductors opened operations in Ipoh in 
1979.  
 
Local involvement with semiconductor manufacturing also started in assembly and test 
                                            
6
 Motorola sold its semiconductor division to Freescale in 2002. 




operations when Carsem (owned by Hong Leong) acquired Carter Semiconductors during 
the mid-1980s industry-wide crisis. Subsequently Unisem (Ipoh) and Globetronics 
(Penang) started similar operations in the early and mid-1990s respectively. Whereas 
venture capital from the government owned Malaysian Technology Development 
Corporation (MTDC) has been used to support Globetronics none of these firms have 
connected in any significant way with government labs (including MIMOS and public 
universities). 
 
Motorola was the first to start wafer fabrication in Malaysia (in Seremban) – but its scope 
was limited to old transistor technology – and the plant closed down in the late 1990s. 
The government managed to attract Infineon to start an 8 inch wafer fabrication plant in 
Kulim to produce power chips in 2005. Government efforts to attract a similar plant from 
Samsung failed as the plant eventually went to India in 2006. The government 
subsequently acquired VLSI in the Silicon Valley, and assisted the founding of Silterra 
(Kulim) and First Silicon (Sama Jaya) and a wafer lab at MIMOS.  By 2001 the labs at 
VLSI and MIMOS had already closed down, and the 1
st
 Silicon plant  in Sama Jaya in 
2007 was only engaged in the fabrication of application specific integrated circuits using 
4 inch wafers. Infineon is still ramping up production while Silterra are engaged in 
supplying fabricated wafers to consumer electronics manufacturers –e.g. Sharp-Roxy. 
Despite these developments almost 100 percent of fabricated wafers used in assembly 
and test operations in Malaysia are imported. Only Infineon’s back-end plant in Kulim 




Semiconductor manufacturing was not targeted as a strategic industry in the 1970s and 
early 1980s when foreign-driven assembly operations expanded sharply. Instead it fitted a 
typical neo-liberal hands-off strategy of inviting labour-intensive low value added 
manufacturing and hence semiconductors were targeted along with other export-oriented 
light manufacturing activities such as garments, consumer electronics and industrial 
electronics. All these industries were offered tax exemptions and tariff-free operations at 
export-processing zones on the basis of investment and employment generation, and 
export intensities. The focus from 1986 following the First Industrial Master Plan (IMP1) 
identified semiconductors as a strategic industry but no targeting was established for a 
systematic catch up. The Malaysian Institute of Microelectronics Systems was 
established in the Prime Minister’s department in 1985 – which was eventually 
corporatized following directions given in the Action Plan for Industrial Technology 
Development (APITD) in 1990 – whose focus was to drive learning and innovation in the 
industry. 
 
Taiwan Like in Malaysia, foreign firms relocated back-end assembly operations in export 
processing zones in the 1960s to start semiconductor manufacturing in Taiwan. 
Government policy was instrumental in making the shift from simply assembly and test 
activities into front-end activities when the Electronic Research and Service Organization 
(ERSO) was established among the Industrial Technical Research Institutes (ITRI) in 
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However, the initial creation of the Industrial Technical Research Institute (ITRI) in 1974 
did not produce significant results as no grants were given to stimulate participation in 
R&D activities. In addition to the science and technology project (STP) funds that were 
disbursed from 1979 ITRI also started to develop incubators to stimulate the birth of high 
tech firms. The Electronic Research and Service Organization (ERSO), the division 
within ITRI involved in supporting R&D in electronics activities became a key driver of 
incubation from 1979 (Rasiah and Lin, 2005). 
 
Leading firms such as TSMC, which is the world’s leading contract manufacturer of 
semiconductor wafers, have subsequently forged strong collaboration with foreign 
technology R&D labs, universities and purchasers to move up the technology trajectory. 
In 2006 TSMC was fabricating cutting edge 12” inch wafers using 0.13 micron chips 
using nanotechnology with R&D support from a range of foreign collaborators providing 
the design support. The firm also announced plans to fabricate microprocessors in 2008 
(Shilov, 27/7/07). 
 
It can be seen that the history of catch up in the semiconductor of the four East Asian 
economies are different from the path taken by the United States. Although differences in 
the distance reached in the technology ladder, organization structures and product types 
manufactured, Figure 1 provides a rough ecology of firms – semiconductor and buyer-
supplier firms, and organizations that constitute an industrial cluster showing the industry. 




Table 1: World IC and Electronics Component Exports, Selected Economies, 1990-2005 
 Value (US$millions) Share in Total Exports 
 1990 2000 2003 2004 2005 2000 2005  a 
World                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ... 307528 278694 330198 345195 4.9 3.4 
Australia                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        20 132 171 217 232 0.2 0.2
Belarus                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          - 33 34 35 36 0.4 0.2 
Brazil                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           79 234 213 212 169 0.4 0.1
Bulgaria                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         ... 7 20 23 44 0.2 0.4
Canada                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           ... 3459 1782 2074 2609 1.3 0.7
China  b                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         128 5352 10401 16184 20413 2.1 2.7
Costa Rica  b                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    ... 51 95 258 813 0.9 11.6
Croatia                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ... 3 46 58 51 0.1 0.6
European Union (25)                                                                                                                                                                                                                              - 58742 51478 61801 60412 2.4 1.5
intra-EU (25) exports                                                                                                                                                                                                                            - 36212 30454 36304 35997 2.2 1.3
extra-EU (25) exports                                                                                                                                                                                                                            - 22530 21024 25497 24415 2.8 1.8 
Hong Kong, China                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 2562 14046 19832 26277 30590 6.9 10.5 
domestic exports                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 550 2520 801 1138 1522 10.7 7.6 
re-exports                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       2012 11525 19031 25139 29068 6.4 10.7 
India  c                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         39 86 175 227 242 0.2 0.2
Indonesia                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        18 739 721 762 738 1.2 0.9
Israel  c                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        143 1782 1067 1269 1139 5.7 2.7
Japan                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            13391 42454 35256 40653 39885 8.9 6.7 
South Korea                                                                                                                                                                                                                               5364 24688 19111 24446 27488 14.3 9.7 
Macao, China                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     ... 3 3 5 ... 0.1 0.2
Malaysia  b                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      4321 18729 22406 23500 23759 19.1 16.9
Mexico  b                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        ... 3064 2172 2523 2220 1.8 1.0 
Morocco  b                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       110 480 601 630 621 6.5 5.8
New Zealand                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      1 17 28 47 58 0.1 0.3
Norway                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           11 30 86 84 122 0.1 0.1
Philippines  b,  c                                                                                                                                                                                                                                1053 16663 15900 15186 15002 41.9 36.4
Romania                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ... 45 19 45 49 0.4 0.2
Russia                                                                                                                                                                                                                               - 102 121 182 131 0.1 0.1
Singapore                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        3675 34436 37039 48459 53866 25.0 23.5 
domestic exports                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 2844 15433 14450 18357 19380 19.6 15.9 
re-exports  c                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    830 19003 22589 30102 34486 32.2 31.9
South Africa                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     ... 25 74 107 130 0.1 0.3
Sri Lanka                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        ... ... 3 3 4 ... 0.1
Switzerland                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      231 677 569 768 838 0.8 0.6 
Taiwan                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  2435 21767 20270 26922 30086 14.7 15.9
Thailand                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         901 5876 6307 6322 6538 8.5 5.9 
Tunisia                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          0 19 19 21 ... 0.3 0.2
Turkey                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           1 11 15 19 25 0.0 0.0
Ukraine                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          - 10 41 17 23 0.1 0.1
United Arab Emirates  c                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ... 46 129 169 ... 0.1 0.2
United States                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    13991 62824 47769 49274 48240 8.0 5.3
Viet Nam  c                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      ... 85 114 151 ... 0.6 0.6
a   Or nearest year; b   Includes significant exports from processing zones; Includes Secretariat estimates.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Source: WTO (2007) 




3 Catch Up Trajectories  
 
In this section we examine the trajectory paths of process and product technologies taken 
by semiconductor firms in China, Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan. The catch up started in 
these economies with entry into the assembly manufacturing of memories by foreign 
multinationals in export-processing zones in all four countries: 1960s in Korea and 
Taiwan, 1970s in Malaysia and 1980s in China. Whereas multinationals began assembly 
and test operations of memory chips, the entry into chip fabrication and chip design 
started with government supported programmes. China had the first government 
programme in the 1950s but the development of the industry from the 1980s has little 
link with that programme. Taiwan and Korea followed next launching formal 
programmes to develop semiconductor manufacturing through the establishment of the 
Electronics Research and Service Organization (ERSO) among the Industrial Technical 
Research Institutes (ITRI) in 1974 and 1975 and the Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI) 
programmes respectively (Mathew and Cho, 2000; Amsden and Chu, 2003; Kim, 1997; 
Rasiah and Lin, 2005). Malaysia earmarked semiconductors among its strategic industries 
in 1986 when launching its first Industrial Master Plan (IMP) in 1986 (Malaysia, 1988). 
 
Unlike foreign affiliates already in possession of the requisite intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) local firms bought licenses or firms to access both product and process 
technologies. The regulatory framework on IPRs first became pronounced with the 1989 
Washington Treaty that legalised industrial layouts in addition to industrial designs and 
patents The governance regime of IPRs were included in the 1995 World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement. 
Local firms’ first access to most product technologies in the four countries first came 
through licensing and acquisition of the firms. Korean firms wre the leading acquirers of 
technology through such a route followed by Taiwanese firms. For a long time 
microprocessor manufacturing was dominated by Intel until AMD won a legal suit to 
enter production in the 1990s. It appeared that American firms will not contract out 
microprocessor fabrication until in 2008 when TSMC announced plans to manufacture its 
first output by the end of the year (Shilov, 2008). 
 
Unlike foreign assemblies that started operations in the 1960s local Korean and 
Taiwanese semiconductor firms went directly into integrated operations from the late 
1970s. UMC was started in 1980 (see Mathew and Cho, 2001; Cheng, 1995) following 
the acquisition of the semiconductor division of RCA in the second half of the 1970s (see 
Rasiah and Lin, 2005). RCA offered UMC ASICs, diodes and transistor technology. 
TSMC (49%) and Phillips (51%) merger in 1987 gave the Taiwanese firms access to 
more sophisticated memory chips such as DRAMs. 
 
Foreign and local Malaysian firms are largely specialized in assembly and test operations. 
Local assembly and test firms are engaged in assembly of second and third generation 
transistors and memory chips while foreign firms are largely manufacturing first and 
second generation memories and microprocessors. Four firms were engaged in wafer 
fabrication in Malaysia in 2007. Although assembly and test dominated semiconductor 
manufacturing when the first waves of operations expanded operation in the 1980s 




semiconductor firms in China have embarked more extensively into wafer fabrication. 
 
Horizontal user-producer links grew between semiconductor firms and suppliers and 
buyers in the United States, Japan and Germany. Several machinery technology 
semiconductor firms coevolved as strong interactions helped machinery firms automate, 
refine, remodify and manufacture more efficient and effective machinery and equipment. 
Taiwan’s world class machinery industry facilitated similar transition. In Malaysia the 
machine tool industry coevolved alongside the semiconductor industry owing to quick 
demand changes that forced even multinationals such as Intel, AMD, Texas Instruments 





Process technology refers to the processes that are undertaken to process or assembly 
products. It refers to machinery and equipment, layouts, inventory and quality control 
systems, production organization and firm-structures. Lead firms in process technology 
are able to drive creative destruction as they are able to lower defects, delivery times and 
costs while raising quality levels. Falling profit margins often drive latecomers lacking 
product innovation rents typically to either drive out high cost incumbents or fill up the 
vacuum left behind them. Apart from industrial layouts of chips and chemical processes, 
cutting edge machinery and equipment and materials most process technologies are not 
subjected to IPRs and hence its diffusion is far quicker and easier than product 
technologies.  
 
Rapid growth of user-producer driven product and process specifications, defect-free 
output and delivery times, also drove closer interface and technology coordination 
between semiconductor firms and buyer firms (e.g. computers, avionics, consumer 
electronics and mobile phones) in all four countries. 
 
Semiconductor firms in all the four countries are engaged in state of the art development 
of process technologies. Taiwan and Korea led in the take up of process patents in 
semiconductor devices issued by the US patent office over the period 2002-2006 with 
2,907 and 2,503 patents. Malaysia and China followed next with 39 and 27 patents each 
over the same period. 
 
 
China Foreign owned multinationals in China relocated significant aspects of process 
technology including just in time systems through their subsidiaries to facilitate better 
coordination between them and buyers.  
 
China has both the Malaysian-type MNC operations and a strongly emerging local base 
resembling Taiwan (Xinxin, 2006). Intel, Freescale, National Semiconductor, Texas 
Instruments and Chippac have largescale assembly and test of semiconductors in China 
targeting export markets. These firms also have backend designing and other operations 
that are important for improving production performance. 





Foreign firms were the initial transmission channel for the movement of process 
technologies to Chinese semiconductor firms. Because the first wave of semiconductor 
firms to China relocated in the 1980s when flexible production systems, automation and 
continuous improvement benchmarks were absorbed by European and American firms 
these techniques were already carried to from the outset among export-oriented firms. 
 
Although the main machinery and equipment in assembly, test and fabrication are still 
imported considerable adaptations have already started in China. By the end of the 1990s 
Chinese firms have already started supplying robotics and automated machinery to 
foreign and local semiconductor firms. 
 
 
Korea Korean semiconductor firms had initially relied on embodied knowledge in human 
capital hired as well as training provided by machinery and equipment suppliers from 
Japan, the United States and Germany. However, as the Japanese firms became more 
reluctant to transfer process technology once Korean firms reached sufficient levels 
maturity they decided to invest on in-house developments (see Kim and Amsden, 1985; 
Kim, 1997; Amsden, 1989).  
 
Integrated manufacturing spreading into consumer and telecommunication products and 
the development of the chemical industries also facilitated the diffusion of low cost 
machinery and equipment, chemical materials, inventory control systems and space 
utilization skills to help Korean firms lower production costs. Integrated operations 
enabled cross transfers of process technology. 
 
Incremental engineering through the absorption of Japanese JIT and kaizen practices 
were instrumental in the rapid diffusion of flexible specialization practices (6-sigma, 
TPM, SGA, teamworking, QCC and TPM) in semiconductor assembly and test in all four 
countries from 1980. Duplicative  imitation and  later creative imitation (Kim, 1997) 
dominated catch up in process technology practices. These developments took place both 
in local and foreign firms. Extensive improvements (including in-house modifications) in 
machinery and equipment (e.g. fully automated machinery and integration of die attach 
and die bonding), materials (e.g. changes in use of sticky tape, shipping tubes and epoxy) 
and layouts helped reduce cost, eliminate defects and shorten throughput time. These 
developments largely diffused from automotive manufacturing in Japan. Volatile 
fluctuations in demand drove firms to keep inventories low and production changes swift. 
 
The emphasis on yield management spread from Samsung to the other semiconductor 
firms such as Hynix in the 1990s. Yield management at the corporate level included 
continuous R&D to improve process technology. Samsung invested huge amount of 
capital in purchasing high-end equipment and machinery, and Hynix focused on R&D of 
new process technology. Korean engineers were highly regarded for their deft skills and 
meticulousness to detail. R&D projects were also conducted at the government level. An 
example is the project conducted by the Ministry of Science and Technology between 
1994 and 1996, the purpose of which was to develop production and process management 






Despite heavy emphasis by the government to stimulate the fabrication and manufacture 
of machinery and equipment local capabilities – including the opening of the Cheon-an 
semiconductor equipment complex – the development of local capabilities have been 
slow so that in 2005 foreign manufacturers and imports still accounted for 80 per cent of 
the machinery bought by semiconductor firms (Song ref?).  
 
 
Malaysia Foreign assembly plants first transferred semiconductor assembly and test  as 
well as related process technologies to Malaysia from 1971. Semiconductor assembly and 
test firms in Malaysia subsequently enjoyed significant transformation in process 
technologies from the late 1970s with the proliferation of automation, flexible production 
systems and its consequent impact on skill training (see Rasiah, 1988, 1994).  
 
Whereas NS (Micro-Machining) and Intel (Intel Automation) started their own machinery 
subsidiaries,  Texas Instruments, HP, Hitachi, AMD, Harris Semiconductor (renamed as 
Intersil and finally as Chippac) and IDT created in-house machinery workshops in 
Malaysia. However, by the mid-1980s Intel, closed its machinery subsidiary while AMD, 
HP and Chippac reduced theirs to emergency solutions (see Rasiah, 1987, 1987, 1996).  
 
Intel in Penang started prototype development from 1980 to facilitate technology transfer 
to local supplier firms to support its own flexibilization and use of JIT operations (see 
Rasiah, 1988, 1994, 1995). Indeed rapid technological obsescelence driven by shortening 
product cycles and miniaturization forced semiconductor firms in Malaysia to establish 
strong interface with machinery suppliers. 
 
Organizational change and a rise in productivity helped reduce real output-fixed capital 
and output-labour ratios in semiconductor firms. Indeed, Intel expanded its output twice 
while reducing its workforce from 8,000 employees to 4,000 employees in 1984 (the 
plants in Barbados and Puerto Rico were closed down to appropriate production 
synergies from these gains) (see Rasiah, 1988).  
 
Driven initially by American firms to absorb cutting edge Japanese and American 
inventory and quality control systems, kaizen practices were introduced in both foreign 
and local firms manifesting in different forms – e.g. small group activities, just-in-time, 
quality control circles and six-sigma – were developed in these firms to raise efficiency 
levels by eliminating defects, downtime and coordinating production flexibly to meet 
volatile fluctuations in demand and prices. 
 
Growth of experiential knowledge in MNCs and the American open framework helped 
the use of Malaysian employees to ramp up new operations, provide expert training and 
process systems in the semiconductor value chain. Indeed, Malaysian engineers and 
managers played an important role in the ramping of manufacturing in Intel in Shenzen 
and Manila, Motorola in Shenzen and AMD in Bangkok in the 1980s. 
 




The local firms of Carsem, Unisem and Globetronics managed to reduce production costs 
in semiconductor assembly and test so much so that they had started to capture demand 
from incumbent American, Japanese and German firms – creative destruction. 
 
Local owned Silterra, by far the most advanced Malaysian local fabrication plant, took up 
5 process patents issued by the US Patent Office in the period 2002-2006. The foreign 
owned Intel and National Semiconductor subsidiaries in Malaysia led patent take up 
issued by the US Patent Office over the period 2002-2006 with 21 and 20 patents each. 
 
Taiwan The initial source of process efficiency improvements was recorded through 
technology transfer by employees gaining experiential knowledge working in American 
and Japanese consumer electronics firms and training provided by machinery and 
equipment suppliers. Taiwanese firms then internalized training and inventory and quality 
control systems in-house once the suppliers became reluctant to supply the laest 
technologies. Like in the other countries kaizen practices manifesting in different forms – 
e.g. small group activities, just-in-time, quality control circles and six-sigma – were 
developed in these firms to appropriate throughput efficiency and make production agile 
and flexible to meet volatile fluctuations in demand and prices. 
 
The domestic machinery industry adapted strongly in Taiwan to the needs of 
semiconductor manufacturing, including wafer fabrication to manufacture cutting edge 
machinery and equipment, and to support modifications in firms. Kaizen practices to 
lower throughput time, reduce defects and meet customer requirements (the OEMs who 
achieved global service provider (GSP) status faced added pressure to remain innovative) 
among Taiwanese firms – part of Schumpeterian Mark I system (creative destruction) 
(see Malerba, 1992; Rasiah and Lin, 2005). 
 
Taiwanese domestic firms – e.g. UMC, ASE, TSMC, Windbond, Asus and Vanguard – 
upgraded and relocated supply base at all major buyer locations, and also introduced and 
refined their capacity to anticipate changes in demand from buyer firms. Network 
cohesion facilitated strong differentiation and division of labour in Taiwan to support 
large scale manufacturing of OEM computers (only Acer is a major local OBM computer 





Unlike in process technology, the catch up process in product technology is much more 
difficult owing to the introduction of intellectual property rights, huge investment and the 
leaps in path dependent knowledge required sustain participation in the development of 
products facing rapidly shortening product cycles. Semiconductor firms in the four 




China Both foreign and local firms in China are engaged in assembly, test, fabrication 




and R&D activities on non-optical, optical, discrete, analog, logic, memories, ASSPs and 
ASICs. While much of the R&D is confined to ASICs, some firms undertake DRAM 
fabrication and R&D (e.g. Intel, Freescale and Qimonda). Government funded R&D labs 
in China’s high tech parks are working on DRAM R&D. 
 
Xinxin – more info required here 
 
Korea Korean companies started with memory products as their specialization memory 
products have large and fast growing market, and provide benefits of mass production 
(see Kim, 1997). Since the competitive advantage in the memory market lies in the 
production technology and equipment, late entrants can also catch up in short time if 
provided with sufficient capital and human resources. Also, the microprocessor industry 
is dominated by Intel with stringent patent laws shielding against new entrants. 
 
Through a series of hiring of Korean human capital embodied with tacit knowledge 
working in foreign firms, acquisition of ailing but strategic foreign firms and licensing 
agreements Samsung started fabricating and manufacturing 64K DRAM chips in 1982 
and by 1984 had reached the frontier of DRAM technology to manufacture 256K DRAM 
chips (see Edquist and Jacobssen, 1987; Kim, 1997). LG Electronics, Hyundai and Hynix 
followed similar patterns of acquiring product technology. 
 
The product technology trajectory of Samsung is shown in Table 2. Samsung’s strategy of 
seeking its human capital, technology and markets globally alongside its own internalized 
development facilities – which included R&D labs and its own university - drove the firm 
to quicken the process of integration so that Hwang’s (the CEO of Samsung) law 
enabling the doubling of memories every 12 months replaced Moore’s (CEO of Intel) law 
that achieved this only in 18 months. By the mid-1980s Samsung had become a driver of 
creative accumulation in semiconductor memory chips. Table 2 shows Korea enjoying 
the highest position in the product technological trajectory of semiconductor firms among 
the four countries. 
 
 
Malaysia Foreign and local Malaysian firms are largely specialized in assembly and test 
operations – the former in the latest product lines. The local firms of Carsem, Unisem and 
Globetronics are engaged in contract assembly and test of low end microchips. Carsem 
was acquired from foreign owned Carter Semiconductor in 1984, Unisem was started 
new by a group of Malaysians who left American semiconductor firms in 1990, and 
Globetronics was started by Intel’s local managers in 1992. Semiconductor multinationals 
acted as training ground to expand experiential knowledge. 
 
In 2007 there were 2 foreign (Infineon and Osram) and 2 local (Silterra and 1st Silicon) 
fabrication houses in Malaysia. These firms are engaged in low end 4 and 8 inch wafer 
technology. Infineon fabricates power chips while the local firms are engaged in the 
fabrication of complementary metal oxide semiconductors (CMOS) and application 
specific integrated circuits (ASICs) respectively both using silicon wafers.  
 




At least 7 semiconductor firms seeking to relocate ASIC and DRAM fabrication in 
Malaysia chose not to after negotiations with MITI, Malaysia. Prime reasons – lack of 
human capital and insufficient capitalization. 
 
After a long dialogue and attempts by the government between the corporatization of 
MIMOS in the early 1990s and Silterra, Southeast Asia’s second largest fabrication 
factory in 2006, started manufacturing operations in late 2000 to fabricate 0.25 micro 
CMOS chips. There were a number of management changes over this period until 2004. 
It was in 2004 when the government-linked investment company, Khazanah, acquired 
control of Silterra providing the much need capital for expansion. Being still new to the 
industry Silterra forged strategic alliance with IMEC which is one of Europe’s leading 
independent research centre which led to the successful fabrication of 8MB SRAM chips 
using 0.13 micron CMOS technology in 2005 (Silterra, 2006) (see Table 2). 
 
Silterra then established a strategic partnership with Key ASIC in 2006 to provide mutual 
customers access to the latter’s IP portfolio and design services on the former’s 0.18- and 
0.13-micron CMOS process technologies. The firm reported having expanded market 
shares following the acquisition of access rights to Key ASIC’s design facilities, and is 
seeking to expand its size to appropriate scale economies. 
 
 
Taiwan Local Taiwanese semiconductor firms went directly into integrated operations 
when UMC was started in 1980 (see Mathew and Cho, 2001; Cheng, 1995) from the 
acquisition of the semiconductor division of RCA in the late 1970s (see Lin, 2002). RCA 
offered UMC ASICs, diodes and transistor technology.  
 
The merger between TSMC (49%) and Phillips (51%) in 1987 gave the Taiwanese firms 
access to DRAM technology. ERSO helped the incubation and creation of several high 
tech firms – including with R&D and wafer fabrication capabilities – e.g. Windbond, 
ASUS, Vanguard and ASE from 1983. 
 
The collapse of RCA coincided with the acquisition of the company’s semiconductor 
division by ERSO in the late 1970s. ERSO gave birth to United Microelectronics 
Company (UMC) in 1980, which started producing ASICs for consumer electronics firms 
(see Ernst, 2000; Mathew and Cho, 2000; Mathew, 2004). Taiwan Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) started subsequently in 1987. TSMC was the first 
contract semiconductor chip manufacturer to separate chip design from chip fabrication 
to specialize on the latter. From wafer fabrication with strong R&D support from 
industrial technical research institutes of ERSO led to the starting of eventually front-end 
operations such R&D and wafer fabrication. Front-end did not integrate with the old 
back-end firms in Taiwan as the companies were different. In the more integrated 
Taiwanese semiconductor companies such as UMC and ASE the back-end activities of 
assembly and test were eventually relocated in China and Malaysia. UMC has also 
relocated wafer fabrication abroad in Singapore and the United States. 
 
Although UMC was the first Taiwanese fabrication plant to open in Taiwan TSMC has 




become the leading Taiwanese fabrication house since the 1990s and hence the focus here 
is on the latter. Once the government successfully negotiated a joint venture with Philips 
holding 51 per cent of the share Maurice Chang who had gained tacit and experiential 
knowledge working in American firms and left Texas Instruments as its Senior Vice 
President was appointed as its founding CEO. Using his knowledge and linkages with 
R&D centres, universities buyers, suppliers and rivals played a key role in charting the 
direction of the firm. 
 
Not only that the leading local semiconductor manufacturers in Taiwan (UMC, TSMC, 
ASE and Winbond) and China have linked with R&D and wafer fabrication that is 
targeted towards sale of important manufacturers – especially computers (e.g. Acer and 
Lenova and the contract manufacturing firms such as Tatung, Vanguard and Asus) as well 
as exports (see Mathews and Cho, 2000; Amsden and Chu, 2003; Rasiah and Lin, 2005). 
Some large American multinationals have also set up R&D and wafer fabrication plants 
in China and Taiwan. Especially in Taiwan considerable R&D off-shoring has occurred 
from the late 1990s – something that began with TSMC – a joint-venture between 
Phillips and Taiwanese capital that was started in 1986. The top three leading 
semiconductor manufacturers in Taiwan are also in the top ten DRAM producers in the 
world. Taiwan’s world class machinery industry has also helped the complementary 
development of semiconductor machinery and equipment.  
 
By 2007 TSMC had become completely Taiwanese owned. From being the world’s first 
independent contract manufacturer of memories entering the manufacturing of 12” wafers 
using nanotechnology the firm announced plans to fabricate through contract 
arrangements microprocessors in 2008 (TSMC, 2008 February 20). TSMC was the first 
to specialize in IC fabrication separating it from IC design. 
 
Overall, semiconductor firms are at the technology frontier in process technology in all 
the four countries examined. However, only firms in Korea and Taiwan are at the product 
technology frontier. Although semiconductor firms in Taiwan are not involved in 
integrated operations and are still heavily but horizontally reliant on strategic alliances for 
markets and technology, they are engaged in cutting edge product technologies in the 
segments they have entered. Korean semiconductor firms are dominated by fairly 
independent access to markets and technological capabilities. Chinese firms come after 
that followed by Malaysia where fabricating firms are heavily reliant on foreign markets 
and technology and are still far from the technology frontier (see Table 3). 
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Table 2: Technology Trajectory of Lead Local Firms 
 
 China Korea Malaysia Taiwan 
 Hua Hong Samsung Silterra TSMC 
1975  Started   




1982  64K DRAM   
1984  256K DRAM   
1986  1M DRAM   
1987    Incorporated 
1988  4M DRAM  Hiring personnel and 
contract  fabrication 
1990  16M DRAM   
1992  256M DRAM   
1996  1G DRAM   
1997 Founded    
1999 DRAM 256MB Nand   
2000  516MB Nand Started  with 
0.25CMOS 
 
2001  1G Nand 0.22 CMOS Range of DRAMs 
2002 Foundry 2G Nand 0.18 CMOS  
2003  4G Nand   
2004  8G Nand  12” wafer 
2005  16G Nand 8MB SRAM Nand  
2006 Plans for 12” 
wafer 
32G Nand 0.13  CMOS  
 
Source: Compiled from Kim (1997: 88); Authors’ interviews (2007); Samsung website; TSMC website; Silterra website. 
 




Table 3: Product Technology Capabilities of Lead Firms, Selected Economies, 2007 
 
Closeness to frontier Capabilities of Firms 
Frontier operations Korea: OBM R&D and fabrication of DRAM/Nand flash 
Frontier operations Taiwan: OEM fabrication capability of frontier DRAM/Nand 
Previous generation 
China: OEM fabrication capability in 0.13 and 0.18 micron 
CMOS, NMOS and DRAMs 
Previous generation Malaysia: OEM fabrication capability in 0.13 0.18 CMOS  
 
Source: Compiled from Kim (1997: 88); Authors’ interviews (2007); Samsung website; 
TSMC website; Silterra website. 
 
  
4. Building Blocks 
 
Having established the technological paths, this section analyses the drivers behind them 
using the broad net expounded in the introduction in this volume by Malerba and Nelson. 
The unfolding of these paths will help explain the differences, if any, of the catch up 
patterns of firms in China, Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan. The technological regime of 
semiconductors can be characterized by high velocity high frequency devices using light 
emitting devices that are expensive (using gallium arsenide material base) that are used in 
mobile phones and related products, and low frequency devices that do not require much 
light emitting functions and are also cheap and abundant (silicon as the base) that are 
used to fabricate memories and microprocessors. TSMC is engaged in all categories, 
Samsung is engaged in memories and nand flash. 
 
 
Access to Foreign Knowledge   
 
Semiconductor assembly and test began with the transfer of technology by multinationals 
to their subsidiaries in Korea and Taiwan since the 1960s, Malaysia from 1972 and China 
from the 1980s. Flagship semiconductor firms such as Intel, AMD, National 
Semiconductor, Hitachi and HP relocated the assembly and test of the cutting edge 
production technology to Malaysia.  This early phases were associated with employment 
generation in export processing zones with little focus on catch up. 
 
Two major and more minor routes to accessing foreign sources of knowledge in the 
semiconductor catch up track can be identified from the four countries. In the first route 
all four countries foreign firms as training grounds to access tacit knowledge. Malaysia 
and China have attempted to use this route with less success. In the first major route, 
Korean, Taiwanese, Chinese and Malaysian firms accessed foreign technology through 
licensing. In the second major route Taiwanese and Chinese firms merged or acquired 
foreign firms to access technology and markets. Among the minor routes, Korea and 
Taiwan used  
 
Korea and Taiwan led the way among the four countries in driving a catch up in the 
semiconductor industry. The Korean government encouraged local firms to license 




technology from foreign companies and to invest abroad to access technology from 
foreign labs. Foreign direct investments made by Korean companies in the U.S mainly 
include setting up local R&D lab to learn cutting-edge technology such as ASIC design 
technology. Samsung and Hyundai set up R&D labs in Silicon Valley in 1983, which 
helped the development of DRAM technology.  
 
Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor companies established strategic alliances with 
leading foreign companies. The purpose of Korean alliances with Japanese firms was to 
learn memory–related technologies and capture the market, whereas alliances with the 
U.S and European companies were mainly intended to learn non-memory technologies 
and capture the market share. UMC grew from ITRI’s acquisition of RCA in 1979 while 
TSMC started as a joint-venture with Philips in 1987. Dependence on foreign firms fell in 
the 1990s in Korean firms but Taiwanese firms such as TSMC, UMC, ASE and Winbond 
remained strongly linked to strategic alliances with foreign firms. 
 
Technological partnerships between foreign companies and Korean and Taiwanese 
companies has taken place since 1970s. Unlike in automobiles Korean electronics firms 
did not merge with foreign firms in Korea. The early fabrication houses of UMC and 
TSMC merged first with RCA and Philips before acquiring them. Korean firms signed 
cross-licensing, royalty and technological alliance agreements with foreign companies 
that filed lawsuit against Korean firms’ infringing on the patent right. Between 1983 and 
1988, Korean semiconductor firms entered 101 technology licensing agreements – 66 
cases of these were with US firms. However, whereas Korean firms have reduced their 
dependence on strategic alliances by the mid-1990s the highly de-verticallized Taiwanese 
firms remain strongly but horizontally attached their strategic partners.  
 
Korean and Taiwanese firms too advantage of the mid-1980s downswing in the industry: 
prices of 64K DRAM chips had fallen from US$50 to US50 cents in 1980-85, and the 
EPROM from US$18 to US$4 in three months in 1985. This Schumpeterian (1912) Mark 
I entry – the displacement of ailing incumbents (see Malerba, 1992; Mathews, 2006) such 
as Mostek (sold subsequently at a low price to Thomson CSF before International Device 
Technology acquired it) and the phasing out of old product lines in AMD, Intel, Texas 
Instruments and National Semiconductor – coincided with the entry of Taiwanese 
contract semiconductor manufacturers. Whereas Korean firms licensed technology from 
foreign firms directly, much of the early Taiwanese forays into foreign technology was 
done through ERSO. The early acquisitions in Taiwan and licenses in Korea allowed a 
key point of entry, which has then been transformed to drive frontier research especially 
in memories – a la the Schumpeterian Mark II development of creative accumulation (see 
Malerba, 1992). 
 
Chinese and Malaysian firms have also accessed foreign technology through licensing 
agreements but with less success.  However, whereas the focus in Korea and Taiwan has 
been on accessing foreign technology by local firms moving up the product technology 
trajectory, in China and Malaysia foreign firms still dominate but largely in the low value 
added production stages of assembly, packaging and test operations. Initiatives to follow 
the Taiwanese framework started in Malaysia and China. The same approach was used in 
China first in the 1980s but the huge labour force of China was unrivalled by other 




countries. The Chinese government allowed total foreign equity when all output was 
exported. The focus in China shifted subsequently in the 1990s as technological 
deepening became important. Hence, both local and foreign firms have managed to 
attract incentives to start R&D operations and wafer fabrication. Attempts to move up the 
value chain in Malaysia have again benefited from two foreign wafer fabrication 
subsidiaries of Infineon and Osram that relocated their technology from abroad 
significant efforts are made to evolve it using in-house expertise. Silterra and 1
st
 Silicon 
established strategic tie-ups with design technology from foreign technology suppliers 
and purchasing firms, R&D labs and universities. The acquisition of of VLSI technology 
in the Silicon Valley in 1997 however did not materialize because the management then 
at MIMOS did not have a strategy to use the knowledge for designing and fabrication 
wafers. The plant was sold in 2001. 
 
 





Export markets were the critical initiator of large scale semiconductor manufacturing in 
Korea, China, Malaysia and Taiwan and remain important (see Table 1; Figure 1). 
China’s semiconductor market nevertheless has become the third largest in the world by 
the end of the 1990s. Ownership regulations in electronics required that foreign 
controlled firms to export most of their output. These regulations were the same in 
Malaysia – at least 80 percent of output had to be exported for firms to hold 100 percent 
foreign equity (see Rasiah, 1995). Although the initial efforts to acquire semiconductor 
manufacturing operations was motivated by the desire to ensure quality support for its 
consumer electronics plants fabrication and manufacturing by Samsung and other Korean 
semiconductor firms relied extensively on export markets. Whereas the local firms are 
also important buyers in Korea, Taiwan and China, foreign firms remain the main 
purchasers in Malaysia. 
 
Taiwanese consumer and IH electronics firms purchase the bulk of their ASICs and 
DRAMs from Taiwanese semiconductor firms. User-producer relations strong in wafer 
fabrication in all four countries as lock-ins play a key role in the wafer fabrication start-
ups. Booking-billing ratios are important in low margin fabrication where yield is critical 
because of the lumpy nature of investment involved. The bulk of semiconductor chips are 
sold to lock in contractors, the rest in open markets. Strong interface between 
semiconductor firms and electronics firms that use chips have been an important element 
driving and shaping the flow of knowledge between them. However, 1st Silicon in 
Malaysia have been losing buyers. Silterra has managed to reverse its fortunes in export 
markets since 2003 and has shown a steady rise from then on. 
 
The acquisition of IBM’s computer manufacturing division has also expanded Chinese 
owned Lenova market share in computers and with that demand for Chinese 
semiconductor firms. In Korea, as of 1990, the export demand accounted for 92.5% and 
the domestic demand accounted for the rest. Since the size of the domestic market was 




negligible, companies focused on the export market. Strong export demand has led to the 
trade balance involving the industry to reach positive figures in Korea and Taiwan (see 
Table 4). 
 
Malaysia and China are still faced a negative balance, though, the ratio is close to zero for 
the former. China’s deficit remains very high owing to heavy imports of components by 
consumer and industrial electronics firms. The relocation of consumer electronics firms 
from Malaysia since the mid-1990s to China, Philippines and Vietnam helped improve its 
trade balance. 
 
Whereas semiconductor firms have largely remained in assembly and test activities in 
Malaysia, their counterparts in Korea and Taiwan and China have in addition upgraded 
strongly to wafer fabrication and R&D activities. In addition to export demand the OEM 
contract manufacturers – especially in export-oriented computers and peripherals –
provide considerable demand for the sale of high value added chips in Taiwan. Hence, 
domestic demand (including in Taiwanese firms that have relocated front-end activities in 
China) have since the second half of the 1980s become major buyers of Taiwanese 
DRAMs and ASICs. Both the Malaysian type and the Taiwanese types of activities and 
demand conditions have evolved in China. 
 
The lack of upgrading has driven Malaysia’s export shares in world exports of integrated 
circuits down in the period 2000-2005 when those of Taiwan and China have continued 
to rise. Exports as a share of world integrated circuits exports from China rose from 1.7 
percent, 3.7 percent and 5.9 percent in 1990, 2000 and 2005 respectively (see WTO, 
2006: Table 4.59). The commensurate figures for Taiwan were 7.1 percent, 7.3 percent 
and 8.7 percent respectively. The Malaysian share rose from 6.1 to 8.0 percent in 1990 
and 2000 respectively, but fell to 6.9 percent in 2005. The latter is expected to fall further 
following a hollowing out taking place currently in the semiconductor industry in the 
country. 
 
Export markets have been the prime catalyst in driving semiconductor demand in all four 
countries, though the Chinese market was the world’s third largest in 2007. 
Semiconductor assembly began in all four countries to supply global markets. As shown 
in Figure 2 and Table 1 the four countries are among the leading exporters of integrated 
circuits in the world. 
 
While export markets essentially provided the demand for semiconductor firms in 
Malaysia, China and Taiwan, access to sell fabricated wafers or assembled and tested 
semiconductor devices from domestically fabricated wafers relied extensively on 
connecting with buyers. In Malaysia the two local wafer fabrication plants enjoy market 
access through a lock-in agreement with consumer and telecommunication electronics 
firms located abroad. Indeed, the wafer fabrication plants were begun after the lock-in 
deals were struck. These demand arrangements are similar to the experience of Taiwan 
and China. Despite the presence of flagship downstream firms such as Intel, Motorola 
and Dell in Malaysia Silterra exported all the wafers it fabricated in 2006 with 70 per cent 
going to North America and the remainder to Asia and Europe.  
 




Table 4: World Exports, Imports and Trade Balance, IC and Electronics Component, 
Selected Economies, 2005 
 
 
Value (US$billion) Trade Balance 
X M (X-M)/(X+M) 
European Union (25) 60.4 68.4 -0.062 
extra-EU (25) exports 24.4 32.4 -0.141 
Singapore 53.9 41.7 0.127 
United States 48.2 26.7 0.287 
Japan 39.9 21.3 0.304 
Hong Kong, China 30.6 41.9 -0.156 
Taiwan 30.1 28.5 0.027 
Korea, Republic of 27.5 23.9 0.070 
Malaysia  a 23.8 27.9 -0.081 
China  a, b 20.4 95.3 -0.647 
Philippines  a 15.0 14.4 0.021 
Thailand 6.5 9.5 -0.186 
Canada 2.6 4.4 -0.252 
Mexico 2.2 11.5 -0.676 
a  Includes significant shipments through processing zones. 
b  In 2005, China reported imports of integrated circuits and electronic components from China 
amounting to $7.4 billion.  For further information, see the Technical Notes.  
c  Includes Secretariat estimates. 
d  Imports are valued f.o.b. 
e  Excludes retained imports of Hong Kong, China. 
 
Source: WTO(2007) 
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The Role of Government  
 
 
Government policy in the promotion of semiconductor manufacturing has also differed. 
From simply offering incentives to attract MNCs direct operations in the 1960s and early 
1970s, the Korean and Taiwanese governments promoted directly the growth of local 
firms. While the human capital gained tacit knowledge, government research institutes 
failed to assist technological catch up in Korea (Kim, 2001). In Taiwan, the government-
led   industrial technical research institutes (ITRI) that were started in 1974 (and the 
electronics labs under the electronics research and service organization (ERSO) have 
been a central anchor in driving R&D to local firms. The heavy and chemical industries 
programme offered Samsung and LG Electronics subsidized credit and support for 
seeking licenses from foreign firms , while in Taiwan the STP grants in 1979 (particularly 
after it was turned into matching grants with the private sector in 1983) and the Hsinchu 
Science Park that offered tremendous R&D synergies. 
 
Korea’s and Taiwan’s technology transfer agreements also actively screened ex ante, 
monitored the use and diffusion and undertook ex post appraisal to ensure licensing fees 
were brought down, diffusion occurred and mistakes were not repeated. Government in 
Taiwan launched an active education policy – at one level driving expansion in human 
capital supply from technical schools and universities and at another level imposing 
levies on unskilled labour imports to pressure firms to upgrade (Tseng, 1994). 
 
China, national S&T plan has been starting to play important roles to enhance the linkage
s of the industry and academia. For instance, the main S&T plans like 863, 973 and suppo
rting plan, within the industrialization relating contents began to encourage firms, researc
h institutes and universities taking on together. Especially, since 2000, China has issued 1
2 significant S&T specific projects, which includes super large scale IC and software. Thi
s project not only adopted the modes that industrial academic collaboration with governm
ental funding as the leading funding, but also tried to established industrialization base. U
p to now, 7 national IC industrialization bases have been established, including Shanghai,
 Xi’an, Beijing, Wuxi, Chengdu, Hangzhou, Shenzhen etc. Within those bases, different 
modes through industrial funding and market information exchanges, training and agenci
es have been adopted to enhance the network. 
 
China has an FDI attraction policy as well as one following Taiwan in the semiconductor 
catch up. Its large labour force supports assembly and test MNC operations in locations 
such as Pearl River Valley and Shenzen, and local integrated firms in high tech parks 
such as GanSu, Shanghai and Tianjin. Public R&D labs play an important role in 
supporting the knowledge base of local firms in China. The acquisition of IBM’s 
computer manufacturing division by Lenovo has given strong horizontal learning 
opportunities to semiconductor firms in China. 
 
Although the government initiated the semiconductor and computer industry in the 1960s 
with the MEI driving R&D, from the 1980s this route was essentially abandoned. 
Labour-intensive low value added assembly and test operations became dominant from 




the 1980s – initially from the relocation of foreign multinationals. Assembly and 
packaging has remained the main semiconductor production activity in China. 
 
The government introduced market protection and incentives to promote domestic 
producers. IC manufacturing – assembly and test enjoyed the first large domestic 
expansion. Several domestic IC manufacturing plants were launched through the national 
seventh, eight and ninth five year plans. By the end of 1999, there were 5 large domestic 
and joint-venture companies – e.g. Huajing, Huayue, Beiling, Xianjin and Shougang 
NEC Electronics. In addition, there were also 10 specialized and 871 electronics factories 
in GanSu province enjoying support from the Microelectronics Industrial Centre of 
Chinese Academy of Sciences. IC manufacturing industry developed rapidly since late 
1990s. Shougang NEC Electronics Co., Ltd started production of 0.56 64M DRAM in 
1996. Huajing started production in its 0.96 CMOS line in 1998. Shanghai Huahong 
started production of 0.58 MOS line in 1999. Comparing with the IC manufacturing 
industry and IC design industry, IC packaging and testing industry was much larger in 
China.  
 
Huada IC Design Centre, the first IC design company in China, was set up in 1986. IC 
design became important in China from the 1990s (see Table 5). Document 18 issued by 
the State Council in 2000 has been an important institutional development that has driven 
IC design development in China. IC design output rose from US$0.2 billion in 1996 to 
US$10billion in 2000 – expanding by around 50 times. By the end of 2003, the number 
of IC design firms in China reached 463. The share IC design industrial sales in overall 
IC industrial sales exceeded 10 percent in 2003. IC design human capital also increased 
in numbers from less than 5000 to 20 thousand in 2003. IC designing occupied 10
th
 place 
in overall market share of sales in 2003  (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5: IC industry structure dynamics, 1996-2004 (US$billion)  
 
Year  IC design IC manufacturing  IC packaging and 
testing  
In total  
1996 0.2 16 22.8 39 
1997 0.3 18 33.5 51.8 
1998 0.8 21 41 62.8 
1999 3 24 84 111 
2000 10 44 130 184 
2001 1.48    
2002 2.16 4.72 19.96 26.84 
2003 5.76 9.54 24.6 39.9 
2004 11 18.12 28.26 57.38 
Source: Digital times, Industrial Trends of Semiconductor industry and components indus
try, industrial values on mainland semiconductor industry, CCID-MRD, P43; Editing com
mittee of China Industrial Maps, China Economy Booming Inspection and Foresight, Chi
na Industrial Maps 2004-2005, Social Sciences Academic Press.  




The Korean government formulated a six year plan to develop semiconductor 
manufacturing within the heavy and chemical industries (HCI) programme that was 
launched in 1975 (Kim, 1997: 88). The chaebols were reluctant to initially to enter 
semiconductor manufacturing owing to the heavy dependence on a foreign technology 
that experienced shortening product cycles. Hence, Samsung only entered semiconductor 
manufacturing when it acquired Korea’s first local semiconductor firms. The acquisition 
of this firm which opened in 1974 not only helped Samsung acquire its operational 
facilities but also add the tacit and experiential knowledge embodied in its founder who 
obtained his doctorate in from Ohio State University and gained experience working in 




Since 1986, the private and public sector have invested intensively in R&D, and Korea’s 
Samsung has become the shaper of the globe’s DRAM technology. In order to promote 
balanced development of both memory and non-memory semiconductors and to improve 
the technological competence of equipment and materials industry, the Korean 
government put forward the System IC Development Project in December 1998. In order 
to strengthen the design field and the non-memory sector, the Korean government and 
local companies ran the IC Innovation Partnership Program from 2001 till 2005.  
However, infrastructure-related investment especially in the non-memory sector is still 
quite low compared to competing countries.  
 
While strong governmental support dominated semiconductor manufacturing until the 
early 1980s, mainly in the DRAM sector, support for integrated circuit manufacturing by 
the 1990s had been limited to three types.. The first type of support is offered directly for 
systems IC development, while the second to finance venture companies, and the third 
for the construction of infrastructure building and training system designers. Examples of 
such governmental support include the System IC 2010 Project and the “ASIC Joint 
Development Project” and “IT Core Parts Development Project” run by the Ministry of 
Science and Technology and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy. Owing to 
the failure of government research institutes (GRIs) (see Kim, 2003), Samsung 
internalized the development of DRAM chips with strong links to R&D centres and other 
firms. Hence, the Korean semiconductor industry has relied strongly on private enterprise 
for its growth. 
 
 
The Malaysian government provided generous incentives from especially 1971 
(following the Free Trade Zone Act) to attract export-oriented firms, in which 
semiconductor firms such as National Semiconductor, AMD, Motorola, HP, Intel, Hitachi 
and Texas Instruments were among the pioneers. The objective then was simply to create 
jobs. The Malaysian government then initiated through the Industrial Master Plan of 1986 
to promote upgrading in manufacturing, including in semiconductors. The Malaysian 
Institute of Microelectronics Systems (MIMOS) was created in the Prime Minister’s 
Department in 1985 to spearhead catch up and innovation in semiconductors and related 
devices. Unlike the experience of Taiwan, China and Korea, MIMOS failed to incubate 
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 Ki-Dong Kang’s firm failed to weather the first oil crisis of 1973-75 and hence sold the firm to Samsung. 




any successful high tech firms in the industry. Its attempts to seek direct participation by 
the multinational firms failed as these firms were only engaged in assembly and test 
activities in the 1980s. The ethnic coloured New Economic Policy (NEP) that targeted 
largely Bumiputera participation in government run firms discouraged any possibility of 
giving special incentives to Chinese controlled firms such as Carsem and Unisem – both 
of which had successfully entered semiconductor assembly and test in the mid-1980s and 
early 1990s. Although Globetronics eventually enjoyed capitalization from the Malaysian 
Technology Development Corporation (MTDC), the government appeared reluctant to 
engage in lumpy investment to drive the introduction of wafer fabrication in these firms. 
 
The Malaysian government did acquire VLSI in the Silicon Valley, which opened 
opportunities for a Mark I entry as the firm was ailing in the mid-1990s. However, 
instead of using it as a vehicle to acquire technology for catch up lacking in a clear 
strategy MIMOS quickly sold the plant. MIMOS was to spearhead the opening of two 
local wafer fabrication plants – Silterra in Kulim in 1999 and 1
st
 Silicon in Sama Jaya in 
2000 – both of which operated without a clear catch up plan and made losses until 2007. 
Nevertheless, Silterra has shown signs of TSMC-type catch-up as the firm has established 
a clear roadmap since and has identified other firms to acquire and partners to establish 
collaboration with since MIMOS has indeed closed down its own fabrication plant at 
Bukit Jalil in 2003. Hence, with the possible exception of Silterra, government policy 
effectively failed to provide the impetus for a catch up to take place in the semiconductor 
industry in Malaysia. 
 
The government shifted its framework of coordinating MIMOS activities in 2005 when it 
hired the former vice president of Motorola to head it. This development along with the 
hiring of human capital with experiential knowledge in the industry - Bruce Guy and 
subsequently Jalaludin Jarjis to lead Silterra through an expansionist capital financing to 
drive up its designing support and scale capabilities helped turn around the firm by 2006. 
 
Foreign multinationals were attracted initially with incentives in the late 1960s to 
undertake export-oriented assembly and test activities. These firms provided jobs that 
were important during the 1960s. RCA was one of the firms to relocate operations in 
Taiwan. The government then targeted the semiconductor division of RCA for the 
acquisition of strategic technology. Government was also involved in the development of 
incubators at ERSO to undertake wafer fabrication activities which started semiconductor 
manufacturing in Taiwan. UMC was the first to be launched by ERSO. ERSO 
subsequently helped the incubation and creation of several high tech firms – including 
with R&D and wafer fabrication capabilities – e.g. Windbond, ASUS, Vanguard and ASE 
from 1983. 
 
Grants initiated through incubators in the Hsinchu Science Park – started originally in 
1979 but became successful after a 1:1 matching condition was attached from 1983  and 
the hiring of professionals brought back under the brain gain programme from the United 
States - were instrumental in the launching of TSMC, Winbond, Vanguard, Asus and 
UMC. Hence, in Taiwan front-end wafer fabrication and R&D eventually took over from 
the original assembly and test operations undertaken by foreign multinationals from the 




late 1960s.  TSMC had become the fourth largest seller of semiconductor devices in the 
first half of 2006 rising from 8
th
 place in 2005 (see Table 6). 
 
Mathews (2006) argues that the government also timed its intervention to enter the 
semiconductor industry during an industry-wide global crisis when incumbent firms were 
facing severe downswings in the mid-1980s. The government subsequently in 1991 
formally approved relocation of labour intensive low value added assembly and test 
activities to mainland China (Rasiah and Lin, 2005). 
 
Korea, Taiwan, China and Malaysia also launched the talent attracting programme, which 
has been very important in the management of high semiconductor firms, and connecting 
them with buyer-supplier firms and foreign R&D centres. However, while Korean, 
Taiwan and China managed to attract a critical mass of human capital with tacit 
knowledge to lead or work for local semiconductor firms the Malaysians have not been 
very successful on this. Some Malaysians returned to work in local firms but they have 
either been overshadowed by ethnic policies or have left because of restrictive 
management practices. 
Table 6: World Market Share of Top 15 Semiconductor Firms Based on Sales, 2005-
2006 
1H2006 2005 Firm Headquarters 1Q2006 2Q2006 1H2006 2005 
1 1 Intel United States 8,040 7,215 15,255 35,395 
2 2 Samsung South Korea 4,365 4,581 8,946 17,838 
3 3 TI United States 3,260 3,505 6,765 11,300 
4 8 TSMC Taiwan 2,389 2,522 4,911 8,217 
5 6 Infineon Germany 2,395 2,477 4,872 8,297 
6 5 ST Italy 2,363 2,491 4,854 8,870 
7 4 Toshiba Japan 2,317 2,154 4,471 9,045 
8 7 Renesas Japan 1,963 2,050 4,013 8,266 
9 10 Hynix South Korea 1,522 1,635 3,157 5,599 
10 11 Freescale United States 1,465 1,535 3,000 5,598 
11 11 Philips Netherlands 1,465 1,534 2,999 5,598 
12 12 NEC Japan 1,386 1,381 2,767 5,593 
13 13 Micron United States 1,242 1,328 2,570 4,954 
14 16 AMD United States 1,332 1,216 2,548 3,936 
15 18 Qualcomm United States 1,018 1,133 2,151 3,457 
Source: Global Sources, http://www.globalsources.com 







Semiconductor manufacturing became knowledge-intensive from the late 1970s. Hence, 
minimum statistical numeracy, communicative, cognitive and judgemental skills are 
important before firms hire even operators. Intel’s super-operators in all four countries 
enjoy a wage premium. The use of JIT and kaizen type practices has raised the demand 
for skilled workers. Schooling in Korea, Taiwan, China and Malaysia provide such labour. 
In addition, participation in wafer fabrication and new product development requires 
strong supplies of R&D engineers and technicians. However, labour markets for skilled 
labour tightened in Taiwan and Malaysia from the 1980s and 1990s respectively.  
Taiwanese and Korean firms relocated labour-intensive assembly and test in Southeast 
Asia since the 1980s and China since the 1990s. Malaysia has suffered a slowing down in 
upgrading because of both a tightening labour market as well as lack of R&D human 
capital. 
 
China’s conversion from centrally planned economy to markets has also provided enough 
human capital to drive catch up in both product and process technologies. The 
engineering intensity of GanSu High Tech Park in China is reported to exceed that of 
Hsinchu Science Park in Taiwan in 2005. China had the largest numbers of R&D 
scientists and engineers among the four countries with 800 thousand in 2000 and 1 
million in 2004. Government institutions and  
 
Among the four Korea and Taiwan launched first a formal policy to attract their own 
national human capital from abroad to provide especially the tacit knowledge to run high 
tech firms. However, whereas well-trained human resources were scattered across 
different industries in Taiwan, the Korean semiconductor industry, backed by the 
investment of chaebols, hired a pool of well trained graduates from science and 
engineering majors. Since the enactment of the Immigration Law in 1965, Korean 
engineers have been working in the United States. Korean chaebols hired them back in 
the 1980s, offering salaries even higher than those of CEOs. To hire those who did not 
wish to come back to Korea, Korean companies established R&D labs in the United 
States to tap their resources.  
 
For example, SSI, Samsung’s R&D lab in Silicon Valley, played a key role in assimilating 
64K DRAM designs and production processes just 6 months after Samsung’s announced 
entry in 1983 into the DRAM business. In a peak year, SSI hired 260 local engineers, 
including a substantial number of Koreans.  Hyundai set up an R&D lab in Santa Clara in 
1983 and at one time employed 430 local engineers.  LG established a relatively small-
scale R&D outpost in Sunnyvale in 1984 and roped in 115 local semiconductor engineers.  
 
Wafer fabrication and R&D – the two going strongly going together – is highly 
knowledge-intensive. Engineers, scientists, and R&D scientists and engineers are a 
critical drivers of these operations. Taiwan supplemented demand for such human capital 
by stepping up their supply as well as through talent attracting programmes. Taiwan is by 
far the most successful here has it has managed to attract Taiwanese specialists who had 




gained tacit and experiential knowledge working in especially American multinationals, 
R&D labs and University R&D centres back. TSMC, ASUS, Vanguard and Winbond are 
examples of high tech firms run by these experts. Maurice Chang has been the CEO of 
TSMC from its founding until now. 
 
In Malaysia automation under conditions of productive and innovation-driven 
flexibilization helped raise demand for skills. Semiconductor firms – especially American 
owned – were the first to use their connections with the state government of Penang to 
canvass for the starting of skills development centres. MNCs funded the Penang 
government’s move to   open the Penang skills development centre in 1989 to conduct 
off-firm training. 
 
While skilling through in-house learning by doing and utilization of the PSDC) has been 
a success, Malaysia has faced severe demand-supply shortfalls that have restricted 
upgrading in the industry. Indeed, Malaysia’s universities have failed to supply the 
requisite numbers and quality of scientists and engineers to firms such as Intel, AMD, 
Hitachi, Motorola (freescale), HP, ST Microelectronics, Texas Instruments and Chippac 
who reported being keen on hiring more engineers and scientists to undertake R&D 
activities since the 1990s. Seven multinationals reported dropping Malaysia when 
considering to relocate wafer fabrication in Malaysia over the period 1997-2007. Foreign 
owned Infineon embarked on an ambitious programme to train engineers and scientists in 
its fabrication plant in Kulim in 2007 while the local owned Silterra has scouted since 
2000 the globe to seek human capital to participate in its expansion plans. 
 
 
Networks, Alliances and Consortiums 
 
Consortiums and strategic alliances have been important in the development of a number 
of firms in these countries. The independent local fabrication and assembly plants of 
China, Malaysia and Taiwan have relied extensively on formally registered strategic 
alliances with foreign firms and R&D centres for key technologies and markets. Enjoying 
large scale and integrated consumer and industrial electronics Korean attempted to work 
together on accessing joint R&D but intense competition in product markets often 
derailed these agreements.  
 
Strategic alliances with foreign firms and labs were critical in the catch up stage of 
integrated Korean firms, and have remained important in the de-verticallized Taiwanese 
firms. Strategic alliances are also critical in Chinese and Malaysian firms but it is too 
early to predict their direction.  
 
The government has been the chief architect ere helping to establishing a consortium to 
pool R&D efforts. Samsung, Hyundai, LG Electronics and Hynix participated in this 
consortium to coordinate their R&D and production internalization efforts until the late 
1990s when intense competition in product markets broker down this relationship. 
Korean firms have since internalized R&D and marketing efforts thereby reproducing 
what Kim (1997) classified as the old Japanese Zaibatsu framework. Large vertically 




integrated firms such as Samsung and LG Electronics manufacture a large share of the 
chips they use in their consumer and industrial electronics plants. 
 
Hence intermediary organizations have largely been insignificant in the development 
semiconductor firms in Korea. Hence, three Korean chaebols organized the Consortium 
of Semiconductor Advanced Research in 1986. Collaborative R&D activities by Samsung, 
Hynix and Hyundai and active governmental support were the main driving force of 
catching-up in the initial stages. By the 1990s cooperation in R&D broke down owing to 
intense competition between these firms in product markets. Hence each firm started to 
develop its own R&D facilities. 
 
Since the semiconductor industry requires huge initial investment, with the life cycle 
being very short, market players need to take bold risks and make swift decisions and 
reactions. One of the biggest advantages of Korean firms lay in the owner-management 
system in which the decision making responsibility was solely given to the owner-CEO 
to facilitate swift market reaction. Thus, the chaebol-driven development strategy was 
especially effective in Korea because CEOs had both the strong initiative and power to 
make swift decisions at critical times.  
 
Korean companies chose standard memory products as their strategic target, in order to 
capture the large and fast growing memory market, and also to enjoy the benefit of mass 
production. Since the competitive advantage in the memory sector comes from the 
manufacturing technology embedded within equipments, late entrants can relatively 
easily catch up the leaders, as long as they are supported by sufficient capital and well-
trained human resources. Koreans firms never feared to make large-scale investments in 
order to rise as the leader in the future market. Samsung Electronics is building the 
second semiconductor complex in Hwa-Sung with the investment of 33 billion USD, 
which will be finished by 2012. Ki-Heung Hwa-Sung Cluster will become the world’s 
largest semiconductor complex, and will facilitate swift decision making and market 
reaction.  
The establishment of TSMC's Design Center Alliance has been highly strategic in 
attracting access to new technology, which is vital for it to specialize in foundry-based 
fabrication. For example Accent joined this alliance in 2004 to supply complex customer 
designs for TSMC's process technologies. Membership in TSMC's Design Centre 
Alliance allows Accent to service companies wishing to utilise TSMC’s foundry 
operations. Accent supplies design support for OEM, fabless and chipless small-to-
medium sized enterprises (SMEs), as well as start-ups.  
Recent projects by Accent for TSMC include the analog-mixed signal IC, capacitive 
interface sensors, a multi-million gate integrated circuit for wireless applications, the 
hardening of an ARM CPU, systems with large memories and analog blocks and a very 
complex IC for networking applications, which include 0.13µm, 0.18µm, and 0.25µm 
technologies. Accent also supplies its very deep submicron (VDSM) design for the 
delivery of incoming 90 and 45 nanometer designs. 




TSMC announced in February 2008 to establish production lines to start fabricating 
central processing units on a 45 nanometer high end process for low cost personal 
computers with a target of start sales by the second half of the year. AMD is widely 
believed to have given the contract to TSMC to develop a low cost method to produce 
microprocessors. This declaration opens the way for catch up from Asian firms without 
which the stringent copyright and patent laws have for long threatened to restrict new 
entrants in the product line. Entry into microprocessors also for the first time offers 
Taiwanese firms the opportunity to leapfrog Korean semiconductor firms have dominated 
in the production of DRAM and Nand flash chips. 
 
Malaysia’s Silterra and 1
st
 Silicon and Chinese local firms remain strongly linked with 
foreign technology suppliers and markets for wafer fabrication activities – though the 
large local market has given the latter less dependence on foreign firms.  
 
 
Co-evolution – driver and driven 
 
Taiwanese firms have by far benefited most from the co-evolution of industries. 
Machinery and chemicals had emerged on a large scale from 1980 in Taiwan. The co-
evolution of these industries as well as the plastics industry through support from ITRI 
helped provide the complementarities essential for process and product technology 
improvements in Taiwan’s semiconductor firms. Indeed a number of latest technologies 
that were developed at ERSO quickly found their place in the chips fabricated by 
Taiwanese firms. One such example is the thin membrane developed to separate 
transistors in wafers. 
 
In Taiwan the semiconductor industry has been simultaneously, the driver as well as is 
being driven, by other industries. On the one hand major developments in chemicals and 
plastics, and machinery and equipment have enhanced semiconductor product 
technologies and process technologies respectively. On the other hand, the proliferation 
of semiconductor technology as the driver has benefited enormously the development of 
automotive parts, computer numeric control (CNCs) and electronic device machinery 
(EDMs), and fish tracking equipment. Microchips fabricated by Taiwanese firms also 
power the industries that manufacture chemicals and plastics. 
 
None of the remaining countries have actually appropriated significant synergies from the 
coevolution of other industries. Local machine tool and plastic injection moulding firms 
co-evolved with upgrading and flexibilization in semiconductor firms in Penang from 
1980s, and in Shenzen, China from the 1990s. Korea and Malaysia remain major 
importers of inputs to the semiconductor industry. However, whereas semiconductor 
firms provide significant fabricated wafer supplies to consumer and industrial electronics 
firms in Korea, firms in Malaysia import all their fabricated wafers. The existing wafer 
fabricators in Malaysia export all production. 
 
 
Conclusions and Implications  






Of the four countries Korean firms are at the global frontier of product technology in 
DRAMs and Nand flash products. Despite acquiring the OEM capability to fabricate 
cutting edge DRAMs, Nand flash and other CMOS products on 12” wafers, Taiwanese 
firms still rely on R&D and designing support from abroad. Chinese firms are in the same 
situation but have not acquired the OEM capabilities to fabricate the latest chips. 
Malaysian foreign and local semiconductor fabrication firms are still engaged in second 
and third generation  power chips and CMOS technology on “4” and “8” wafers. Korean 
and Taiwanese firms have relocated much of their assembly and test activities in China 
and Southeast Asia while Chinese and Malaysian firms still largely specialize in these 
activities. 
 
While multinationals started the first large scale assembly and test of semiconductor 
devices, local firms spearheaded the first critical mass of fabrication activities in all the 
four countries. China’s initial experience with the spawning of semiconductor technology 
within computer industry in the 1950s did not trigger subsequent manufacturing for 
export markets. Despite the similarities, the evidence amassed in this chapter using the 
lenses provided by Malerba and Nelson in the introduction of this volume show 
significant differences in the channels that drove catch up in the four countries. The one 
major similarity across the four countries is the role government played in the initial 
regulatory environment as well as investment – either through direct ownership or 
subsidized credit - to fabricate wafers and support technological catch up.  
 
The paths taken by firms in the two leading countries on the manufacturing of 
semiconductor chips - i.e. Korea and Taiwan - are very different. Whereas the Korean 
firms eventually became independent through zaibatsu-type integrated operations back-
integrating from consumer and telecommunication electronics manufacturing into 
semiconductors and internalizing R&D activities Taiwanese firms have remained highly 
specialized in wafer fabrication or vertically integrated operations within semiconductors 
while continuing to depend strongly on R&D support from ERSO and foreign firms. 
Taiwanese firms also continue to enjoy strong collaboration in particularly participation 
in R&D activities among themselves as well as foreign research labs and designing 
companies. In addition, some Taiwanese firms such as TSMC and UMC have continued 
to specialize in contract wafer fabrication foundries without participation in assembly and 
testing. These firms have also continued to rely extensively on strategic alliances for both 
technological support and markets. Being highly vertically integrated Korean firms have 
gradually reduced their dependence on strategic alliances as they moved to the 
technology frontier. 
 
The nature of state intervention in all four countries differed. Whereas Korean firms 
relied on licenses the firms internalized much of the R&D activities because of the failure 
of the GRIs Taiwanese firms have successfully access R&D labs directly from ERSO and 
the other ITRI labs for complementary technologies. The lack of human capital and 
performance standards has undermined the capacity of subsidized local wafer fabricators 
in Malaysia to upgrade. Chinese wafer firms demonstrate better capacity to upgrade 




because of large reserves of human capital and better coordination with performance 
standards. 
 
Unlike in Korea and Taiwan where rising production costs have driven out assembly 
activities, in China and Malaysia foreign firms still largely specialize on such activities. 
The lion’s share of semiconductor manufacturing in China and Malaysia is still 
specialized in assembly and test activities. With 497 local designing plants in 2006 China 
enjoys very strong capacity to expand designing and fabrication activities. Government 
participation – both federal and provincial – has been crucial in the establishment of 
design parks and in the forging of links between firms, R&D labs and universities. Some 
firms have taken the Taiwanese path by specializing in foundries while others have 
attempted to integrate computer, telecommunication and industrial electronics with 
semiconductor chip manufacturing. Local firms in Malaysia are either confined to 
assembly and test or in the fabrication of second and third generation semiconductor 
chips. Silterra is the most promising of these firms and is seeking to follow the TSMC 
path. This firm has forged alliances with foreign purchasers and technology suppliers and 
is seeking to expand scale operations and purchase design firms to complement its 
activities. Lacking in technology support from the short pool of engineers and poor 
facilities in R&D labs and local universities this firm is expanding its hiring of foreign 
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